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Abstract
In the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis, the role of monetary policy and macro-prudential
regulation in promoting ﬁnancial stability is under discussion. The old debate concerning
whether monetary policy should respond to credit and asset price bubbles was revived,
whereas macro-prudential regulation is being assessed as an alternative macroeconomic tool
to deal with ﬁnancial imbalances. The paper explores both sides of the debate in a New
Keynesian framework with ﬁnancial frictions by comparing the welfare and stabilisation
impacts of distinct policy regimes. First, we investigate whether there is a welfare beneﬁt
from monetary policy leaning against ﬁnancial instability. We show that monetary policy
rules of this type perform better than conventional monetary rules. Second, by introducing
macro-prudential regulation in the model, results from optimal policy analysis suggest also
that there are welfare gains, even in the case in which monetary and macro-prudential
authorities are independent and react to their own policy goal.
JEL classiﬁcation: E30, E50, G28.
Keywords: monetary policy, macro-prudential policy, DSGE, ﬁnancial frictions.
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Non-technical summary
This paper aims at investigating the role of monetary policy in promoting ﬁnancial stability
and its interaction with macro-prudential regulation. Before the ﬁnancial crisis, there was
a broad consensus in the literature stating that monetary policymakers should target price
stability without taking pre-emptive measures to avoid the development of asset prices bubbles.
However, some argue that monetary policy should also react to ﬁnancial variables, such as credit
and indebtedness, and help countervailing the development of ﬁnancial imbalances. On the
other hand, policymakers and researchers in general advocate the need for a macro-prudential
oversight of the ﬁnancial system, to monitor and mitigate the building up of systemic risks
across ﬁnancial institutions and throughout time.
We address both sides of the debate by developing a model with price stickiness, ﬁnancial
imperfections and a macro-prudential oversight of the banking system. Our focus is on standard
monetary policy measures and we suggest as a macro-prudential tool a non-neutral tax / subsidy
scheme. Optimal policy exercises are conducted to assess the gains (or losses) in terms of social
welfare of these alternative policy regimes.
First, we evaluate whether monetary policy should respond to ﬁnancial variables, such as
credit, credit spreads or asset prices, under the assumption of the existence of disruptions in the
banking system. Second, we introduce a macro-prudential instrument to examine the impact
of having a macro-prudential regulator reacting countercyclically to ﬁnancial imbalances. This
exercise is performed under two policy mandates1. We assume that each policy targets its own
policy goal, meaning that monetary policy pursues price stability and macro-prudential policy
focus on ﬁnancial stability. Then, we extend the analysis by assuming that monetary policy also
reacts to ﬁnancial imbalances, in order to replicate an uniﬁed institutional mandate, in which
both monetary and macro-prudential policies target ﬁnancial stability objectives.
It is worth highlighting that in this paper we do not compare coordination in the form of
joint maximization with non-cooperative Nash equilibrium for non-coordination, since, for both
regimes, the same welfare criteria is being used. Nonetheless, with given forms of simple rules,
a Nash equilibrium would be a `team-optimal solution' and oﬀer an identical solution as with
coordination.
We show that, in a model featuring ﬁnancial frictions, a leaning against the ﬁnancial im-
balances monetary policy rule would perform better in terms of maximizing welfare than a
standard, conventional monetary policy rule. However, rules responding to credit spreads and
1The expressions policy mandate and policy regime are used indistinctly throughout the paper. They
refer to the institutional arrangements of monetary policy and macro-prudential regulation, and should not be
mistaken with the arguments of central bank loss function.
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asset prices would be related to higher inﬂation volatility, as claimed in the literature. As a
matter of compromise between welfare maximization and macroeconomic stability, our results
suggest that a monetary policy rule that could accomplish this balance would be one feeding
back on credit only, given that it provides a smaller welfare loss compared to a standard Taylor
rule, at the same time it delivers lower inﬂation, output and interest rate volatility.
In the case of scenarios encompassing a macro-prudential policy approach, our ﬁndings
from optimization exercises are interesting from a policy perspective. First, they conﬁrm the
countercyclical nature of macro-prudential tools. More important, we show the deployment of
macro-prudential regulation together with standard monetary policy improves welfare, regard-
less of the target selected in the analysis and, to some extent, of the type of policy mandate
under assessment (separate or uniﬁed). The welfare maximization is achieved, though, under a
partially uniﬁed mandate featuring a macro-prudential rule that reacts simultaneously to credit
and credit spreads. The welfare gains from introducing macro-prudential regulation are, in the
best case scenario, around 0.07% in consumption equivalence terms. This improvement is, in
fact, small, but aligned with previous ﬁndings in the literature (see, for instance, De Paoli and
Paustian [2012], Angelini et al. [2011]). Inﬂation stabilization, on the other hand, is better
accomplished in a separate mandate, in which we have a standard Taylor rule feeding back on
inﬂation and output gaps, and a macro-prudential rule responding to credit and spreads.
Therefore, our ﬁndings, despite showing macro-prudential regulation improves welfare in
every policy mandate considered in the analysis, do not provide a deﬁnite answer in terms of
the institutional mandates monetary and macro-prudential policies. A separate policy regime
seems to perform also well in what welfare improvement is concerned. This ﬁnding is not
fully aligned with the consensus among policy makers and academics towards the joining of
macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy under a same authority.
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1 Introduction
Prior the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007 there was a convergent mindset on policy goals, the instruments
necessary to achieve them, and their implications for stabilising the economy. Back then, there
was a common view that central banks should focus on price stability goals and clean up
after the bubbles burst.2 As a consequence of the ﬁnancial crisis and its disruptive eﬀects on
economic welfare, the debate regarding the role of monetary policy and traditional regulatory
and prudential frameworks on promoting macroeconomic stability was revived. It is argued
that the great recession was a consequence of an excessively lax monetary policy stance that
contributed to the increasing of housing price inﬂation (Taylor [2007, 2010], Hofmann and
Bogdanova [2012]). On the other hand, a large literature emphasizes the failure of ﬁnancial and
banking regulation as a ﬁnancial stabilisation tool (Blanchard et al. [2010], Fund [2011]).
Although it is clear that the achievement of ﬁnancial stability3 is crucial for the pursuit
of macroeconomic stability, there is no consensus on what economic policy should target the
stability of the ﬁnancial system. Mishkin [2011] suggests that monetary policy should lean
against credit-driven bubbles only (rather than responding to irrational exuberance bubbles),
pointing out that in the case of credit bubbles the argument about the diﬃculty in detecting
asset price bubbles is no longer valid. On the other hand, Vinals [2012] considers that monetary
policy rules should also lean by reacting to ﬁnancial variables, such as credit and indebtedness,
but only in the pursuit of price stability. In addition, Curdia and Woodford [2010] suggest
a Taylor Rule that also reacts contemporaneously to credit spreads, showing that a modiﬁed
Taylor Rule of this kind can not only decrease the distortions originated by a ﬁnancial shock,
but also improve the economy reaction to diﬀerent types of shocks.
In turn, it is argued that macro-prudential regulation should deal with ﬁnancial market
distortions, while monetary policy should concentrate solely on stabilising inﬂation in order to
counter-act the ﬂuctuations of output caused by price rigidities. Notwithstanding, this type
of institutional framework raises some concerns. A main topic in the design of an eﬀective
institutional mandate for macro-prudential policy is how it should interact with monetary policy.
Even though we agree that price and ﬁnancial stability are intermediate objectives to attain the
ultimate goal of macroeconomic stability, there are side eﬀects from monetary policy on macro-
2See Mishkin [2011] for a summary of the general doctrine stating that monetary policy should only focus on
inﬂation and output stability.
3There is still a lack of a common deﬁnition of ﬁnancial stability. As summarized by Galati and Moessner
[2012], ﬁnancial stability can be deﬁned in terms of the degree of robustness of the ﬁnancial system to external
shocks or, in turn, it can be interpreted as the resilience of the ﬁnancial system to shocks originated from within
the system that can be associated to bank fragility. For the Bank of England, 2009, the source of shocks is not
so relevant, since ﬁnancial stability should be fundamentally concerned with maintaining a stable provision of
ﬁnancial services to the wider economy - payments services, credit supply, and insurance against risk.
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prudential targets (such as credit or leverage) and from macro-prudential policies on monetary
targets (such as output and inﬂation). For instance, as pointed out by Beau et al. [2011],
it is likely that the implementation of a macro-prudential policy can alter the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy, since it acts through the same bank lending and balance sheet
channels of monetary policy.
Under diﬀerent economic circumstances, the outcomes on ﬁnancial and price stability of
both policies can be complementary, independent or conﬂicting (Beau et al. [2011]). In partic-
ular, the conﬂict of interest outcome will depend on the type and dissemination of supply and
demand imbalances across the ﬁnancial system and the real economy and on whether ﬁnancial
imbalances play a role in the monetary policy framework (Beau et al. [2011], Galati and Moess-
ner [2012]). Moreover, some authors advocate the existence of a risk taking channel, through
which a loose monetary policy can contribute and even promote the creation of asset bubbles,
requiring a more aggressive intervention from the macro-prudential regulator to mitigate its
eﬀects in the banks' balance-sheets and in the ﬁnancial systems (Borio and Zhu [2008]). In
turn, considering a situation characterized by an asset bubble and by downside risks to price
stability, macro-prudential policy would limit credit and liquidity growth. This action could
have adverse eﬀects in aggregate activity increasing the disinﬂationary pressures and forcing
the monetary policymaker to intervene by lessening even further the monetary policy stance.
Under these economic conditions, the necessary measures to control ﬁnancial stability may have
a negative impact on price stability, resulting in a conﬂicting outcome (Beau et al. [2011]).
Therefore, a main question in this debate is how macro-prudential policy tools should be set
together with monetary policy, since both ultimately target macroeconomic stability. Following
the Tinbergen principle, there should be at least one instrument associated to each policy goal.
Assuming price and ﬁnancial stability as two distinct objectives, then monetary policy should
target the ﬁrst one and macro-prudential policy should concentrate on counterveiling ﬁnancial
imbalances. If we agree with this straight assignment of policy objectives, a consequent issue
refers to the allocation of the policy instruments, namely whether the central bank, as the
monetary policy maker, should set the two policy instruments to achieve both price and ﬁnancial
stability, or macro-prudential tools should be allocated to an independent authority.
The economic literature investigating these issues is still in its infancy, though there are
a number of papers oﬀering preliminary insights and suggesting diﬀerent ways of combining
monetary policy and macro-prudential regulation. Despite the distinctive features of the models
used to assess these questions, all in all the ﬁndings suggest that there are sources of conﬂict,
mainly when these policies are not coordinated and shocks aﬀect the demand side of the economy
(De Paoli and Paustian [2012], Bean et al. [2010], Beau et al. [2011], Angelini et al. [2011],
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Angeloni [2010]).
This paper contributes to both sides of the debate and has two main purposes. Departing
from a New Keynesian model with ﬁnancial frictions, the ﬁrst aim is to investigate whether
there is a welfare beneﬁt from monetary policy that leans against the wind by performing
welfare analysis. In this part of the study, macro-prudential policies are absent. Speciﬁcally,
our model-based analysis enables us to examine the potential trade-oﬀs of using simple monetary
policy rules that feed back on ﬁnancial variables, such as deviations of credit, credit spreads or
asset prices from its steady state values, by comparing it with a standard Taylor rule. Two policy
mandates are suggested to conduct this analysis. A policy mandate featuring a conventional
monetary policy stance encompassing a standard Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing and
responding to inﬂation and output gaps and a policy mandate in which the standard Taylor rule
is augmented to feed back on ﬁnancial variables. The former policy mandate is used throughout
the paper as a baseline case.
The main ﬁndings of this analysis suggest it is welfare improving to have a monetary policy
stance that responds countercyclically to asset prices. Nonetheless, there is a trade-oﬀ in terms
of inﬂation stabilization, since an augmented Taylor rule of this type would involve more prices
volatility than a standard one. A compromise between welfare maximization and inﬂation
stability seems to be achieved under a policy regime characterised by an augmented Taylor rule
that feeds back on deviations of credit from its steady-state path.
The second main goal is to analyse the impact on welfare of introducing in the model
macro-prudential policies reacting counter-cyclically to ﬁnancial imbalances. Again, the ﬁnan-
cial imbalances are captured by ﬁnancial variables like deviations of credit, credit growth, credit
spreads and loans-to-output ratio from their steady state values. By extending the framework
to include macro-prudential tools alongside with a monetary policy instrument (i.e. the policy
interest rate), it is possible to assess how the institutional arrangements of monetary policy
and macro-prudential regulation could be designed in the most eﬀective way. In fact, it is not
consensual in the academic literature whether the monetary authority should also concentrate
responsibilities in banking regulation and supervision. Arguments favouring an independent
banking regulator, namely potential sources of conﬂict between the two policies and reputa-
tion damage for the central bank in the event of ﬁnancial distress or bank failures, oppose to
arguments beneﬁting an uniﬁed mandate, which privileges the central bank's role as lender-of-
last-resort and coordination synergies.
Against this background, we suggest two more policy mandates which we can compare and
evaluate in terms of their social welfare implications. The criterion used to assess the most
eﬀective institutional mandate is obtained from the welfare analysis, in which policy rules are
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optimised to deliver the best level of lifetime utility. We start by examining a separate policy
mandate, in which each policymaker targets their own policy goal: the monetary policymaker (i.e
the central bank) pursues price stability and the macro-prudential regulator focus on ﬁnancial
stability4. This institutional mandate is compared with an uniﬁed regime, where both monetary
and macro-prudential policies react to ﬁnancial imbalances. This comparison is made across all
policy mandates considered in the analysis, to rank the ones that minimize welfare losses.
The way banking regulation is introduced in the macroeconomic model, it is feasible to assess
the impact on welfare of a macro-prudential toolkit comprising a tax on loans and a subsidy on
bank net worth. This is a innovative feature of the framework, since previous studies considering
banking regulation instruments usually focus on a single tool. We show that a tax on loans
proves to be more welfare improving than the subsidy on net worth. For this reason, we opt for
describing in detail the optimal policy exercises when a tax on loans is considered, although we
also comment brieﬂy on the results attained when the macro-prudential instrument is a subsidy
on net worth.
Findings from these optimal policy exercises suggest that there are welfare gains from in-
troducing macro-prudential regulation, even when considering a separate regime given by two
independent agencies reacting to their own policy goal. In particular, gains are slightly higher
under an uniﬁed regime, in which both policies feed back on credit and spreads. However, these
gains are small as also shown by Angelini et al. [2011], De Paoli and Paustian [2012] and Bailliu
et al. [2012].
The model developed in this study extends the Gertler et al. [2012] framework in several
directions. The most important innovation comes from the introduction of nominal frictions, in
order to investigate the interaction of macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy. Hence,
our focus is on conventional monetary policy rather than credit policy. In addition, we simplify
the banking sector component of the model, ruling out the role of outside equity. In this case,
banks' net worth increases are given solely by retained proﬁts. The macro-prudential tool is
also distinct, since we suggest a non-neutral tax / subsidy scheme.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model, by ﬁrst
considering an unregulated banking sector and then comparing this baseline model with one
extended to introduce macro-prudential regulation. Calibration of fundamental parameters is
also described in this part of the paper. Section 3 explains and performs welfare analysis.
This section shows and interprets the optimal policy results for the policy mandates described
above (standard monetary policy stance, a monetary policy rule that leans against the build up
4The separate mandate aims at mimicking the institutional arrangements of monetary and macro-prudential
policies in Germany, Finland and Norway, while the uniﬁed mandate represents the institutional regimes in New
Zealand, United Kingdom, Belgium and in the Euro Area.
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of ﬁnancial imbalances, and for alternative policy regimes that encompass a macro-prudential
policy rule). Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section, we introduce a model with ﬁnancial frictions and macro-prudential regulation.
The model follows closely Gertler et al., 2012, but it is extended to include New Keynesian
features, in order to address the interplay between conventional monetary policy and macro-
prudential regulation. Financial frictions impact on real economy through the amount of funds
that are available to the banks, aﬀecting the liabilities side of their balance sheet. The economy
is populated by four types of economic agents: households, ﬁnal goods producers, capital goods
producers, retail producers and banks.
2.1 Households
In this model, there is a continuum of households of measure unity. Each household consumes,
saves and provides labour. The individuals belonging to each household can be either workers
or bankers, by a fraction of f and 1 − f , respectively. The fraction f of workers provide
labour and the wages they earn come back to the household. On the other hand, the fraction
1 − f of bankers manage one of the banks that is owned by the households and return to the
household they belong the any dividends they make over the period they manage the bank.
It is also assumed that members can interchange roles. Bankers may become workers every
period with probability 1−σB , which is independent of how long the individual has performed
that role. Thus, the probability that a member of the household stays as a banker is given
by σB. The banker only returns the accumulated earnings to his / her family when he / she
exits from the bank. The assumption of a ﬁnite horizon for bankers is needed in order to avoid
the accumulation of net worth beyond a certain threshold, that would made them independent
of external funding. Conversely, every period a similar number of workers randomly becomes
bankers.
Households utility is given by
Λt = Λ(Ct, Lt) =
((Ct − χCt−1)(1−%)L%t )1−σc − 1
1− σc (1)
where Ct is real consumption and Lt is leisure. Single period utility Λt is an increasing non-
separable Cobb-Douglas function of consumption relative to external habit, χCt−1, and leisure
Lt and has a functional form consistent with a balanced growth path. The parameters σc and
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% refers to the elasticity of consumption and the households preferences, respectively.
Let Dt be the amount of deposits made by households on banks
5 at time t, that pay Rext ex
post gross real interest rate adjusted for gross inﬂation, Tt lump sum taxes, Υt the net transfers
from ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms owned by households and Wt the nominal wage.
Therefore, the household budget constraint is given by
Ct +Dt+1 = WtLt + Υt +R
ex
t Dt + Tt (2)
In a cashless version of the model, household behaviour is then described by
Λt = Λ(Ct, Lt) =
((Ct − χCt−1)(1−%)L%t )1−σc − 1
1− σc
ΛC,t = (1− %)(Ct − χCt−1)(1−%)(1−σc)−1(1− ht)%(1−σc))
ΛL,t = %(Ct − χCt−1)(1−%)(1−σc)L%(1−σc)−1t (3)
Rext =
Rn,t−1
Πt
(4)
ΛC,t = βEt
[
Rext+1ΛC,t+1
]
(5)
ΛL,t
ΛC,t
=
Wt
Pt
(6)
Lt ≡ 1− ht (7)
where Rn,t, our monetary policy instrument, is the gross nominal interest rate set in period t to
pay out interest in period t+ 1, Πt ≡ PtPt−1 where Pt is the retail price level, ht is hours worked
and Wt
Pt
is the real wage. Rext in the Fischer and Euler equations, (4) and (5) respectively, is the
ex ante real interest rate.
The Euler consumption equation (5), where ΛC,t ≡ ∂Λt∂Ct is the marginal utility of consumption
and Et[·] denotes rational expectations based on agents observing all current macroeconomic
variables (i.e., 'complete information'), describes the optimal consumption-savings decisions of
the household. It equates the marginal utility from consuming one unit of income in period t
with the discounted marginal utility from consuming the gross income acquired, by saving the
income. Equation (6) equates the real wage with the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure.
5Both deposits and government debt are one period real bonds that pay the same gross real return from t to
t− 1.
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2.2 Goods Producers
Goods producers behaviour is given by
Y Wt = F (At, ht, Kt) = (Atht)
αK1−αt−1 (8)
Yt = (1− c)Y Wt (9)
PWt
Pt
Fh,t =
PWt
Pt
αY Wt
ht
=
Wt
Pt
(10)
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + (1− S(Xt))It (11)
Demand for capital is given by
Rk,t =
(1− α)PWt
Pt
Y Wt /Kt−1 + (1− δ)Qt
Qt−1
(12)
Equation (8) is a Cobb-Douglas production function for the wholesale sector that is converted
into diﬀerentiated goods in (9) at a cost cY Wt . Kt is physical capital that goods producers buy
to capital producers and At is the productivity shock. From the optimization problem we get
Equation (10) for the demand of labour, where Fh,t ≡ ∂Ft∂ht equates the marginal product of labour
with the real wage, and 11 for the demand for capital. Demand for capital is given by the return
on capital Rk,t, that equalizes the gross marginal product of capital net of depreciation (δ). Pt
and PWt are the aggregate price indexes in the retail and wholesale sectors respectively. Capital
accumulation is given by (11) and we assume convex investment adjustment costs a la Smets
and Wouters [2007]. Note here Kt is end-of-period t capital stock. The production of physical
capital is determined in the next subsection.
2.3 Capital Producers
To determine investment, following Smets and Wouters [2007], we introduce capital producing
ﬁrms that at time t convert It of output into (1−S(Xt))It of new capital sold to goods producers
at a real price Qt, commonly known as Tobin's Q. They then maximize with respect to {It}
expected discounted proﬁts
Et
∞∑
k=0
Dt,t+k [Qt+k(1− S (It+k/It+k−1))It+k − It+k]
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where Dt,t+k = β
k
(
ΛC,t+1
ΛC,t
)
is the real stochastic discount rate over the interval [t, t+k]. Deﬁning
Xt ≡ ItIt−1 results in the ﬁrst-order condition
Qt(1− S(Xt)−XtS ′(Xt)) + Et
[
Dt,t+1 Qt+1S
′(Xt+1)X2t+1
]
= 1
We complete this set-up with the functional form for S(X),
S(X) = φX(Xt − (1 + gt))2
where g is the balanced growth rate. Note that along a balanced growth path Xt = 1 + gt
and investment costs disappear. This is a convenient property because then the steady state is
unchanged from introducing investment costs.
2.4 Retail Producers
In order to introduce sticky prices used in New Keynesian DSGE model, we follow the technique
proposed by Calvo [1983]. We assume that there is a probability of 1 − ξ at each period that
the price of each retail good m is set optimally to P 0t (m). If the price is not re-optimised, then
it is held ﬁxed. For each retail producer m, given its real marginal cost MCt, the objective is
at time t to choose {P 0t (m)} to maximize discounted nominal proﬁts
Et
∞∑
k=0
ξkDNt,t+kYt+k(m)
[
P 0t (m)− Pt+kMCt+k
]
(13)
subject to the equation for demand for investment by each producer
Yt+k(m) =
(
P 0t (m)
Pt+k
)−ζ
Yt+k (14)
whereDNt,t+k ≡ βk ΛC,t+k/Pt+kΛC,t/Pt is the nominal stochastic discount factor over the interval [t, t+k].
The solution to this is
Et
∞∑
k=0
ξkDNt,t+kYt+k(m)
[
P 0t (m)− Pt+kMCt+kMSt+k
]
= 0 (15)
where an exogenous stochastic mark-up to the steady-state MS ≡ 1
1− 1
ζ
has been introduced.
The mark-up shock follows a AR1 process, which is described in 2.7.
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With indexing by an amount γ ∈ [0, 1], price dynamics in equilibrium are given by
Ht − ξβEt[Π˜ζ−1t+1Ht+1] = YtΛC,t (16)
Jt − ξβEt[Π˜ζt+1Jt+1] =
(
1/(1− (1
ζ
))
)
MCtMStYtΛC,t (17)
Π˜t ≡ Πt
Πγt−1
(18)
1 = ξΠζ−1t + (1− ξ)
(
Jt
Ht
)1−ζ
(19)
∆t = ξΠ˜
ζ
t∆t−1 + (1− ξ)
(
Jt
Ht
)−ζ
(20)
where ∆t is a measure of price dispersion across retail ﬁrms each setting their prices at
diﬀerent periods.
Real marginal costs in the retail sector are given by
MCt =
PWt
Pt
(21)
The aggregate resource constraint in the economy is expressed by
Yt = Ct +Gt + It (22)
The real side of the model is completed with a balanced budget constraint with lump-sum
taxes.
2.5 Banks
The banking sector model is inspired in Gertler and Karadi [2011] and Gertler et al. [2012],
with some diﬀerences. First, we assume that total net worth is given by the initial transfer
from households to new bankers and it accumulates through retaining proﬁts. In our model,
we rule out the role of outside equity and therefore increases in the net worth of the banks
are made exclusively through retained earnings. This feature has an important implication for
macro-prudential policy, since a bank is likely to need more time to recover from a shortage of
net worth, making the impact of macro-prudential regulation more signiﬁcant (Angelini et al.
[2011]).
Financial frictions aﬀect real activity via the impact of funds available to the banks, but
there is no friction in transferring funds between banks and nonﬁnancial ﬁrms. Given a certain
deposit level a bank can lend frictionlessly to nonﬁnancial ﬁrms against their future proﬁts. In
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this regard, ﬁrms oﬀer to banks a perfect state contingent security.
First, we start by describing a laissez faire version of the banking sector, in which banking
regulation is not enforced. Then, macro-prudential regulation is introduced and we show how
it changes the banking sector equilibrium.
2.5.1 The Laissez-Faire Banking Sector
The activity of the bank can be summarized in two stages. In the ﬁrst one, banks raise deposits
and equity from the households, over the period [t, t + 1], the 'time period t'. In the second
stage banks use these deposits to make loans to ﬁrms. Loans (st) are priced at a price Qt.
Therefore, Qtst correspond to the amount of loans that banks provide in period t. The asset
against which the loans are obtained is end-of-period capital Kt. Capital depreciates at a rate
δ in each period.
The banking sector's balance sheet is simple: the assets side is determined by loans, while
the liabilities side comprises household deposits and net worth. This implies a banking sector's
balance sheet of the form:6
Qtst = nt + dt (23)
where st are claims on future returns from one unit of a goods producer's capital at the end-of-
period t to ﬁnance capital acquired at the end of period t for use in period t+ 1. Qt is the price
of a unit of capital. Therefore Qtst are the amount of loans that coincide fully to the assets of
the bank and they equal the sum of deposits (dt) and net worth (nt).
Net worth of the bank accumulates according to:
nt = Rk,tQt−1st−1 −Rext dt−1 (24)
Rk,t are real returns on bank assets given by
Rk,t =
[Zt + (1− δ)Qt]
Qt−1
where Zt is the gross return (marginal product) of capital and Zt + (1− δ)Qt represents the net
return after depreciation.
Banks face an exogenous probability of exiting of 1 − σB  [0, 1] per period and therefore
survive for i − 1 periods and exit in the ith period with probability (1 − σB)σi−1B . Given the
fact that the representative bank pays dividends only when it exits, the banker's objective is to
6In a slight departure from notation elsewhere, lower case denotes the representative bank. Upper case
variables later denote aggregates.
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maximize expected discounted terminal wealth Vt
Vt = Et
∞∑
i=0
(1− σB)σiBΛt,t+1+int+1+i (25)
where Λt,t+i = β
iΛC,t+i/Pt+i
ΛC,t/Pt
is the stochastic discount factor, subject to an incentive constraint
for lenders (households) to be willing to supply funds to the banker.
To understand this dynamic problem better we can substitute for dt from (23) and rewrite
(24) as
nt = R
ex
t nt−1 + (Rk,t −Rext )Qt−1st−1 (26)
which says that net worth at the end of period t equals the gross return at the real riskless
rate Rext nt−1 plus the excess return over the latter on the assets. With these returns and Qt
exogenous, the bank net worth in all future periods is determined by its choice of {st+i} subject
to a borrowing constraint.
To motivate an endogenous constraint on the bank's ability to obtain funds, we introduce
the following simple agency problem as in Gertler and Kiyotaki [2010]. We assume that in
the period of time from having obtained funds from households and making loans, but before
paying their debts to its creditors, the bankers may steal a fraction of assets Θ  [0, 1] to his /
her family. In the recognition of this possibility, households limit the funds they lend to banks.
The fraction of funds that a banker can divert is determined by the balance sheet composition.
If a banker diverts assets for his / her personal gain, he defaults on his debt and shuts down and
the creditors may re-claim the remaining fraction 1 − Θ of funds. Because creditors are aware
of the bank's incentive to divert funds, they will restrict the amount of funds they provide to
the bank. In this way a borrowing constraint may arise. In order to ensure that bankers do not
divert funds the following incentive constraint must hold:
Vt ≥ ΘtQtst (27)
The incentive constraint states that for households to be willing to supply funds to a bank,
the banker's franchise value Vt must be at least as large as his / her gain from diverting funds.
The optimization problem for the bank is to choose a path for borrowing, {st+i}, to maximize
Vt subject to (23) and (24) or equivalently (26) and (27). To solve this problem we guess a linear
solution of the form:
Vt = Vt(st, nt) = µs,tQtst + νd,tnt = µs,tQtst + νd,tnt (28)
where µs,t ≡ νs,tQt −νd,t is the excess value of bank assets over deposits and νd,t is the marginal
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value of deposits.
The banker's Bellman equation for a given path of nt can be written in the form
Vt−1(st−1, nt−1) = EtΛt,t+1[(1− σB)nt + σB max
st
Vt(st, nt)] (29)
Then, we perform the optimization by maxst Vt(st, nt) subject to the incentive constraint (27).
The Lagrangian for this problem is
Lt = Vt + λt[Vt −ΘQtst] = (1 + λt)Vt − λtΘQtst (30)
where λt > 0 if the constraint binds and λt = 0 otherwise.
The ﬁrst order conditions for the optimization problem are:
st : (1 + λt)µs,t = λtΘ
λt : µs,tQtst + νd,tnt ≥ ΘQtst
We now deﬁne φt to be the leverage ratio of the representative bank that satisﬁes the incentive
constraint:
Qtst = φtnt (31)
where φt is given by
φt =
νd,t
Θ− µs,t (32)
Using (31) we can write (28) as
Vt = [µs,tφt + νd,t]nt (33)
and hence (29) becomes
Vt(st, nt) = EtΛt,t+1[1− σB + σB(µs,t+1φt+1 + νd,t+1)]nt+1
≡ EtΛt,t+1Ωt+1nt+1
= EtΛt,t+1Ωt+1[Rk,t+1Qtst −Rext+1dt] (34)
using (24) and deﬁning Ωt = 1−σB +σB(νd,t+φtµs,t). Ωt+1 is a term augmenting Λt,t+1, the
household's stochastic discount factor, given that banker's horizon is diﬀerent from household's,
due to the exit probability bankers have to face. With σB > 0, Ωt+1 represents the shadow
value of an extra unit of net worth.
Comparing (34) with (28) and equating coeﬃcients of st and dt, we arrive at the determi-
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nation of νs,t and νd,t :
νd,t = EtΛt,t+1Ωt+1R
ex
t+1
νs,t = EtΛt,t+1Ωt+1QtRk,t+1
Hence
µs,t ≡ νs,t
Qt
− νd,t = EtΛt,t+1Ωt+1(Rk,t+1 −Rext+1) (35)
At the aggregate level the banking sector balance sheet is:
QtSt = Nt +Dt
At the aggregate level net worth is the sum of existing (old) bankers and new bankers:
Nt = No,t +Nn,t
Net worth of existing bankers equals earnings on assets held in the previous period net cost of
deposit ﬁnance, multiplied by a fraction σB, the probability that they survive until the current
period:
No,t = σB{(Zt + (1− δ)Qt)St−1 −Rext Dt−1}
Since new bankers cannot operate without any net worth, we assume that the family transfers
to each one the fraction ξB/(1 − σB) of the total value assets of exiting entrepreneurs. This
implies:
Nn,t = ξB[Zt + (1− δ)Qt]St−1 (36)
The complete banking sector model is given by:
St = Kt
(1 + λt)µs,t = λtΘ
QtSt =
φtNt
(1 + ξBRk,tφt)
φt =
νd,t
Θ− µs,t
Nt = Rk,t(σB + ξB)Qt−1St−1 − σBRext Dt−1
Dt = QtSt −Nt
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νd,t = EtΛt,t+1Ωt+1R
ex
t+1
µs,t = EtΛt,t+1Ωt+1(Rk,t+1 −Rext+1)
Ωt = 1− σB + σB(νd,t + φtµs,t)
Rk,t =
Zt + (1− δ)Qt
Qt−1
Zt =
(1− α)PWt Y Wt
Kt−1
2.5.2 The Regulated Banking Sector
In this section we introduce macro-prudential regulation, assuming a tax / subsidy scheme, in
the lines of Gertler et al. [2012] and De Paoli and Paustian [2012]. We assume two diﬀerent
instruments, that alter the balance-sheet composition of the banks. One instrument is a tax
/ subsidy on loans and it changes according to diﬀerent macro-prudential policy rules. On
the other hand, we also introduce a subsidy / tax on the net worth of banks. Based on some
recent literature modeling macro-prudential regulation, the choice of the instruments does not
aim at reproducing exactly the current countercyclical capital requirements deﬁned in Basel III
regulatory framework. However, as countercyclical time-varying capital requirements, it also
reacts countercyclically to ﬁnancial variables variations, such as credit, credit-to-GDP ratio and
credit spreads.
Total taxes from the macro-prudential regulation scheme are given by
TMRt = τtQtSt − τ stNt (37)
The macro-prudential regulatory scheme diﬀers from Gertler et al. [2012] in the sense that
it is non-neutral in terms of its ﬁscal impact.
The timing of the tax regime is as follows. In period t− 1, tax and subsidy rates τt−1, τ st−1
are set to be paid or received on the value of end-of-period t − 1 (or beginning of period t)
loans Qt−1st−1 and end-of-period net worth nt−1 respectively. The net worth of the bank then
accumulates in period t according to:
nt = Rk,tQt−1st−1 −Rext dt−1 + τ st−1nt−1 − τt−1Qt−1st−1 (38)
That is, net worth equals gross returns minus gross costs of borrowing, plus subsidies minus
taxes carried over over from the previous period. Banks are atomistic and take the tax rate and
subsidy as exogenous.
With this timing for taxes or subsidies, the balance sheet of the bank in period t remains as
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before:
Qtst = nt + dt (39)
which says that net worth plus subsidies plus deposits can be used to ﬁnance loans net of tax.
As before we can substitute for dt from (39) and rewrite (38) to give
nt = R
ex
t nt−1 + (Rk,t −Rext )Qt−1st−1 − TMRt−1
= (Rext + τ
s
t−1)nt−1 + (Rk,t −Rext − τt−1)Qt−1st−1 (40)
which says that net worth at the end of period t equals the gross return at a real riskless rate
plus the excess return over the latter on the assets plus subsidies minus taxes carried over from
the previous period.
The optimization problem for the regulated banking sector is similar to the one described
above, but it takes into account the changes in the balance-sheet derived from the introduction
of regulatory tools.
Aggregation follows as before and now total net taxes from the macro-prudential regulation
scheme are given by
TMRt = τtQtSt − τ stNt (41)
The government budget constraint now becomes
Gt = Tt + T
MR
t (42)
so that tax revenues from the scheme alter the lump-sum taxes required to ﬁnance government
expenditure.
The complete banking model is summarized by
St = Kt
(1 + λt)µs,t = λtΘ
QtSt = φtNt
φt =
µn,t
Θ− µs,t
Nt = Rk,t(σB + ξB)Qt−1St−1 − σBRext Dt−1 − σBTMRt−1
Dt = QtSt −Nt
TMRt = τtQtSt − τ stNt
µn,t = Et
[
Λt,t+1Ωt+1(R
ex
t+1 + τ
s
t )
]
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µs,t = Et
[
Λt,t+1Ωt+1(Rk,t+1 −Rext+1 − τt))
]
Ωt = 1− σB + σB(µd,t + φtµs,t)
Rk,t =
Zt + (1− δ)Qt
Qt−1
Zt =
(1− α)PWt Y Wt
Kt−1
with τ st or τt exogenous. Clearly in the absence of taxes or subsidies, i.e. τt = τ
s
t = 0, we get
back to the previous set-up.
It is worth highlighting that µs,t, the excess value of assets over deposits, and µn,t, the excess
value of net worth over debt are similar to νd,t and νs,t, apart from the fact that they are aﬀected
by the macro-prudential regulation instruments, τt and τ
s
t . The inclusion of macro-prudential
instruments of this kind alters the shadow value of assets and net worth, by altering the cost
of borrowing and the interest margin of lending (spreads). Therefore, it modiﬁes the franchise
value of banks and, in particular, it has an impact on the optimal composition of banks' balance
sheets. The cost of borrowing, Rext+1, increases by τ
s
t , the subsidy on net worth, which makes
more attractive for banks to fund themselves by raising net worth instead of collecting deposits.
On the other hand, the interest margin obtained from lending activities decreases by τt, the tax
on loans, making lending less proﬁtable.
2.6 Policy Rules
To close the model, we introduce monetary and macro-prudential policy rules. We suggest not
only a standard Taylor rule but also monetary rules that lean against the wind, by responding to
ﬁnancial variables behaviour, such as deviations of credit and asset prices from their steady state.
We also propose alternative macro-prudential rules which also feed back on variables related to
the ﬁnancial sector, to assess the performance of these ﬁnancial indicators in improving social
welfare. A comparison across diﬀerent policy rules is implemented and the optimal rules are
those whose policy coeﬃcients maximize social welfare, measured by the inter-temporal utility.
We follow the approach of using optimal simple and implementable rules as recommended in
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [2007]. Their paper favours this kind of policies given their advantage
of setting policy variables as a function of a small number of easily observable, macroeconomic
indicators, since it does not require knowledge of the eﬃcient levels of output or credit. At the
same time, these policy rules provide the same level of welfare as the Ramsey-optimal policy.
Moreover, this approach is commonly used in the macroeconomic literature, see for example
Bailliu et al. [2012] and Lambertini et al. [2013].
ECB Working Paper 1784, April 19
Based on this set of monetary and macro-prudential policy rules, four policy mandates
are investigated. The ﬁrst policy regime assumes a sole monetary policy mandate, featuring a
standard Taylor rule pursuing inﬂation stability. In this policy mandate, macro-prudential tools
are ignored and this institutional framework is set as a baseline case, that will be compared
with policy regimes comprising leaning against the wind monetary rules and macro-prudential
policy. This leads us to the second policy regime, in which a leaning against the wind monetary
policy is considered.
The third and fourth policy regimes result from the extension of the ﬁrst and second regimes
to include macro-prudential policy instruments. In the third policy regime, macro-prudential
rules are introduced alongside with a standard monetary policy rule. This regime mimics an
institutional framework in which the central bank is in charge of price stability only and the
macro-prudential authority is concerned with ﬁnancial stability. In this case, there are two
economic authorities that operate independently of each other. The fourth regime relaxes this
assumption by considering a partially uniﬁed institutional regime7, since it is assumed that both
the central bank and the macro-prudential authority target ﬁnancial stability.
2.6.1 Monetary Policy Rules
In these study we assume that monetary policy can be a standard Taylor rule, reacting to
inﬂation and output gaps, or it can also respond to ﬁnancial variables. Following Curdia and
Woodford [2010], we consider an augmented Taylor rule that feeds back on credit spreads. In
addition, we also suggest credit and asset prices as alternative ﬁnancial indicators.
The baseline policy regime is then given by a standard Taylor rule:
log
(
Rn,t
Rn
)
= ρr log
(
Rn,t−1
Rn
)
+ (1− ρr)
[
θr,pi log
(
Πt
Π
)
+ θr,y log
(
Yt
Y Ft
)]
+ MPS,t
As already explained, this monetary policy rule is used as a baseline scenario for comparison
with the alternative policy rules considered in the analysis.
The general augmented monetary policy rule takes the form:
log
(
Rn,t
Rn
)
= ρr log
(
Rn,t−1
Rn
)
+ (1− ρr)
[
θr,pi log
(
Πt
Π
)
+ θr,y log
(
Yt
Y Ft
)
+ θr,Q log
(
Qt
Q
)
+ θr,s log
(
1 + Et
[
Rk,t+1 −Rext+1
]
1 +Rk −Rex
)
+ θr,QS log
(
Qtst
Qs
)]
+ MPS,t
where Et[Rk,t+1−Rext+1] is the credit spread, Qtst is credit and Qt is Tobin's Q, that represents
7In contrast with a fully uniﬁed institutional regime, that would be one in which both the monetary and the
macro-prudential authorities would target price and ﬁnancial stability.
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asset prices in this model. The coeﬃcient ρr controls for the degree of interest rate smoothing,
while θr,pi, θr,y, θr,Q, θr,s, and θr,Qs control for the degree of aggressiveness of the policy rate
response to inﬂation, output, asset prices, spreads and credit, respectively. Lastly, εv,t is an
i.i.d. monetary policy shock. The variables without time subscripts denote their respective
steady state values and Y Ft refers to the ﬂexi-price output.
This general augmented simple rule is divided in four diﬀerent combinations, depending on
the ﬁnancial indicator(s) chosen to infer the their eﬀectiveness in improving welfare outcomes.
Therefore, we examine simple augmented Taylor rules feeding back alternatively on credit, credit
spreads, assets prices or credit and credit spreads simultaneously.
2.6.2 Macro-prudential Policy Rules
The objectives, instruments and targets of monetary policy rules are already quite established
in the literature. In contrast, issues still remain concerning the objective of macro-prudential
policy and what tools should be used in order to achieve its goal.8 In this paper, we follow
the view of the Bank of England, 2009 (BoE, 2009, thereafter), that establishes that macro-
prudential regulation is implemented to assure ﬁnancial stability through the monitoring of the
credit supply during upswings and downturns. The BoE (2009) approach states that macro-
prudential policy has the role of creating a capital buﬀer during upswings and relax credit
conditions during economic downturns. The view that credit booms are related to ﬁnancial
and business cycle crisis is claimed by Minsky [1972] and it is underpinned in empirical works,
including Jorda et al. [2011] and Schularick and Taylor [2012]. Against this background, the
paper provides a characterization of macro-prudential policy as a macroeconomic stabilisation
policy instrument rather than as a means of preventing ﬁnancial crises.
The literature suggests a range of indicator variables related to credit booms,9 such as
credit growth, output growth, credit-to-GDP ratio, credit spreads, among others. The Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (2010) underscores the advantages of using credit-to-GDP
ratio over credit growth, namely referring that this measure being a ratio, it is not aﬀected by
the cyclical behaviour of credit demand, since it is normalised by the size of the economy (given
by output). In addition, it shows smoother behaviour patterns than credit growth.
Focusing our analysis on one ﬁnancial indicator only may be misleading to assess the eﬀec-
tiveness of macro-prudential policy. Based on the literature, we suggest the use of credit, credit
spreads, loan-to-GDP ratio and credit growth as deviations from their steady state. We examine
diﬀerent simple Taylor-type macro-prudential rules feeding back on these indicator variables.
8For a discussion, see Galati and Moessner 2012.
9See Bank of England, 2011 and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010.
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Regarding the regulatory tools, we ﬁrst select the tax on loans, τt, to be used alongside the
nominal interest rate.10 The general form of the macro-prudential regulation rule is then given
by
log
(
1 + τt
1 + τ
)
= ρτ log
(
1 + τt−1
1 + τ
)
+ (1− ρτ )[ατ,QS log
(
Qtst
Qs
)
+ ατ,s log
(
1 + Et
[
Rk,t+1 −Rext+1
]
1 +Rk −Rex
)
+ ατ,QS/Y log
 QtstYt
Qs
Y Ft
+ ατ,∆Qs cgt
cgss
]
+ MRS,t
where QtSt
Y t
represents the loan-to-GDP ratio at time t , cgt =
Qtst
Qt−1st−1
represents credit growth at
time t regarding the previous period t−1 and cgss is the steady state value of cgt. The remaining
feedback variables are credit spreads and credit, as already described for the monetary policy
rule. In addition, the coeﬃcients of the macro-prudential policy rule are given by ρτ , which
measures the degree of persistence of the macro-prudential instrument, ατ,Qs, ατ,s, ατ,∆Qs and
ατ,Qs/Y , which denote the degree of response of the macro-prudential policy tool to deviations in
credit, credit spreads, credit growth and loan-to-GDP ratio. We expect ατ,Qs, ατ,Qs/Y , ατ,∆Qs > 0
and ατ,s < 0, as conditions to ensure a counter-cyclical macro-prudential regulation. If credit,
credit growth and loan-to-GDP ratio exceed their respective steady states, taxes are raised
thereby lowering loans and dampening the business cycle; on the other hand, if credit spreads
exceed their steady state, taxes are lowered, increasing lending and bursting the business cycle.
As before, variables without time subscripts denote their respective steady state values and Y Ft
refers to the ﬂexi-price output.
2.7 Shock Processes
Our dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model features standard macroeconomic shocks as
well as a ﬁnancial crisis shock. Regarding the former, we consider monetary policy (MPSt),
macro-prudential policy (MRSt), government spending (Gt), technology (At), trend (1+gt) and
mark-up (MSt) shocks. In what concerns the ﬁnancial crisis shock (ψt), we follow Gertler and
Karadi [2011], that suggest a capital quality shock to mimic the subprime crisis of 2007/2008.
All the shocks follows a AR1 process of the form:
log(MPSt) = %MPS log(MPSt−1) + MPS (43)
10For this purpose, we set the subsidy on net worth equal to zero, τst = 0 . We also perform optimal policy
analysis by assuming a subsidy on net worth as a macro-prudential policy tool and compare the outcomes.
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log(MRSt) = %MPS log(MRSt−1) + MRS (44)
log(Gt) = (1− %) logG+ %G logGt−1 + G (45)
log(At) = %A log(At−1) + A (46)
log(1 + gt) = log(1 + g) + Atrend (47)
log(MSt) = %MS log(MSt−1) + MS (48)
log(ψt) = %ψ log(ψt−1)− ψ (49)
where MPS, MRS, G, A, Atrend, MS, ψ ∼ i.i.d. N(0, σ2i).
2.8 Calibration of Fundamental Parameters
The values for the model parameters are summarized in Table 1. We choose standard values in
the literature for preference and technology parameters and we deﬁne as a time unit a quarter.
Table 1: Calibrated Parameters
Macroeconomic Parameters Symbol Value
Discount factor β 0.9921
Growth Rate g 0.0184/4
Government expenditure-output ratio gy 0.20
Labour Share α 0.70
Depreciation rate δ 0.025
Habit in consumption χ 0.7
Substitution elasticity of goods ζ 7.0
Fixed cost c 1ζ = 0.14929
Preference parameter % 0.8806
Investment parameter φx 2.0
Indexing parameter γ 0.2
Elasticity of Consumption σc 2.0
Banking Parameters
Bankers Survival Probability σB 0.975
Transfer for New Bankers ξ 0.002
Asset divertibility Θ 0.410
Regarding the banking sector parameters, our calibration follows closely the one adopted in
Gertler and Kiyotaki [2010] and Gertler et al. [2012]. We set σB, the rate of survival of banks,
by assuming that banks survive for 40 quarters on average (10 years). Therefore, 40 = 1
1−σB
and σB = 0.975. The values of the fractions of initial net worth and assets divertibility, ξ and Θ
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respectively, are computed to hit an economy wide leverage ratio of four and to have an average
credit spread of 100 basis points per year. In the AR1 shock processes, standard deviations of
i.i.d shocks are calibrated at 1% and persistence parameters at 0.75. The preference parameter
% is calibrated to hit a hours worked steady-state target of h = 0.35.
3 Welfare Analysis
We compare the performance of alternative policy regimes in terms of social welfare. This
section is structured in two subsections, based on the policy regimes under analysis. The
ﬁrst subsection deals with policy regimes in which only monetary policy rules are considered.
Speciﬁcally, a standard monetary policy stance is implemented and used as a baseline scenario
to which alternative policy regimes are compared. These alternative policy regimes consider
augmented Taylor rules responding to ﬁnancial imbalances. Welfare analysis is then conducted
for both policy regimes and results are shown and commented.
The next subsection presents policy regimes featuring not only monetary policy rules, but
also macro-prudential policy rules, under separate and partially uniﬁed mandates.
In each policy regime, the optimal policy rules are those whose policy coeﬃcients grant the
consumption and hours worked paths that maximize the inter-temporal utility (Λ), given by
Λt = Et
[
(1− β)
∞∑
t=0
βtΛT+t
]
(50)
where Λt = U(Ct, ht) is the household's single-period utility function.
These welfare comparisons across policy regimes can also be interpreted in terms of consump-
tion equivalence calculation. Given a particular equilibrium path for consumption and hours
worked, Ct and ht, we compute the increase in the steady-state single-period utility, following
a 1% increase in consumption:
CEt ≡ Λt (1.01Ct, 1.01Ct−1, ht)− Λt (Ct, Ct−1, ht) (51)
Then, we compute the consumption equivalence percentage (ce1(%)) by ﬁrst selecting the
rule among a set of distinct policy rules that maximizes welfare (Λ∗) and using it as a benchmark.
Then, we calculate the welfare deviation of each policy rule from the maximum welfare value (Λ∗)
and we normalise it by the percentage change in consumption in the deterministic steady-state
that would give households the same unconditional expected utility in the stochastic economy,
CE = 0.00224, in our model. Among a subset of policy regimes, ﬁgure ce1(%) represents the
loss in welfare from considering policy regimes distinct from the one that maximizes welfare. For
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the policy regime that maximises welfare we set ce∗1(%) = 0%. The consumption equivalence
percentage is useful to compare welfare outcomes within each subset of policy regimes.
Nevertheless, a measure of welfare performance is needed to compare outcomes across all sets
of policy regimes, which is represented by ce2(%). The normalisation procedure is then adopted
to make the comparison of welfare outcomes across diﬀerent policy regimes more comprehensible.
By departing from the consumption equivalence concept, the normalisation is calculated by the
welfare deviation of each policy rule (Ω0) from the welfare ﬁgure obtained under laissez faire (i.e.
under a standard Taylor rule). The denominator of this ratio remains the same,CE = 0.00224.
Therefore, we obtain a measure of the change of welfare for each policy regime over the standard
Taylor regime. A negative ﬁgure indicates a welfare cost and a positive ﬁgure indicates a welfare
gain.
The parameters of the model are kept constant across all policy regimes.
3.1 Optimal Standard Taylor Rule and Leaning-Against-The-Wind
Monetary Policy
With the aim of investigating whether, in a macroeconomic model with nominal and ﬁnancial
frictions, monetary policy should also respond to ﬁnancial imbalances, we compute optimal
simple rules for monetary policy feeding back on ﬁnancial variables. For this purpose, we
compare an interest rate smoothing standard Taylor rule, that reacts to inﬂation and output
gaps, with augmented rules that also respond to ﬁnancial variables, such as credit, credit spreads
and asset prices. Then, from a set of monteray policy rules, we identify the one that is welfare
maximizing. Three diﬀerent augmented monetary rules are considered in this analysis: a rule
reacting to inﬂation, output and credit gaps; a rule targeting inﬂation, output and credit spreads
gaps and a rule responding to inﬂation, output and Tobin's Q gaps. The format of these rules
was described in section 2.6.1.
Table 2 summarises the computation results for the welfare-optimised coeﬃcients for each
of these monetary policy rules.11
11The computation procedures are implemented in Dynare 4.2.4, using a second-order perturbation solution
of the model with a particular policy rule interfaced with a standard Matlab minimization procedure.
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Table 2: Optimal Monetary Policy Rules - Optimised Coeﬃcients
# Policy Regimes ρr (1− ρr)θr,pi (1− ρr)θr,y (1− ρr)θr,QS (1− ρr)θr,s (1− ρr)θr,Q
1 Std Taylor Rule (TR) 0.1697 4.4243 0.0711 - - -
2 Aug TR react. Credit 0.7029 5.0000 0.0000 0.0316 - -
3 Aug TR react. Spreads 0.5335 4.4803 0.0000 - -1.9619 -
4 Aug TR react. Tobin's Q 0.2053 3.4922 0.0000 - - 0.5174
We ﬁnd that monetary policy should respond to increases in credit or asset prices regarding
their steady-state values by raising interest rates, on one hand. On the other hand, monetary
policy should lower interest rates in the case of a rise in credit spreads. Thus, results show that
an optimal monetary policy that leans against the wind would react countercyclically to credit,
credit spreads or even asset prices. The ﬁnding associated to a simple rule that also reacts to
credit spreads is in line with results from Curdia and Woodford [2010], which also demonstrate
that monetary policymakers should relax the monetary policy stance whenever credit spreads
increase. Previous literature does not back up our result for a rule feeding back on asset prices.
In particular, in a model with credit market imperfections, Faia and Monacelli [2007] show that
an optimal monetary policy strategy is one that reacts to asset prices increases by lowering
interest rates.
Our ﬁndings also show that the optimal reaction to output ﬂuctuations around its ﬂexi-price
level would be zero, whenever we consider a monetary policy stance feeding back on ﬁnancial
variables.
The policy regimes are ranked using a welfare criterion. Table 3 shows the computed welfare
outcomes, both in absolute (Λ) and normalised (ce2(%)) terms. As already mentioned, the
normalisation procedure is adopted to facilitate comparison of welfare performance across policy
regimes in distinct tables and it is calculated by dividing the welfare outcome in absolute terms
for each policy rule by the welfare outcome under laissez faire, which, in our model, we assume
it is given by the welfare outcome under the standard Taylor rule. Table 3 is completed with
the consumption equivalence criterion(ce1(%))
12 and the standard deviations of interest rates
(σr), inﬂation (σpi) and output (σy).
12As explained in Section 3, we compute the consumption equivalence percentage by ﬁrst selecting the rule
that maximizes welfare (Λ∗) and using it as a benchmark. Then, we calculate the welfare deviation from each
policy rule from the maximum welfare value (Λ∗) and we normalise it by the percentage change in consumption
in the deterministic steady-state that would give households the same unconditional expected utility in the
stochastic economy.
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Table 3: Optimal Monetary Policy Rules - Welfare Losses / Gains and Std Deviations
# Policy Regimes Λ
Welfare Loss Welfare Gain
σr σpi σy
ce1 (%) ce2 (%)
1 Std Taylor Rule (TR) -1.886534 0.0615 baseline 0.0119 0.0020 0.0230
2 Aug TR react. Credit -1.886529 0.0593 0.0022 0.0097 0.0018 0.0227
3 Aug TR react. Spreads -1.886480 0.0375 0.0241 0.0100 0.0027 0.0210
4 Aug TR react. Tobin's Q -1.886396 0.0000 0.0615 0.0103 0.0036 0.0189
Welfare outcomes suggest that the monetary policy rule that minimizes welfare losses is an
augmented one that reacts to asset prices (captured by the variable Tobin's Q in this model).
Compared to this rule, the alternative regimes imply welfare losses ranging from 0.04% (policy
regime 3) to 0.06% (policy regime 1) in terms of consumption equivalence. Moreover, every
augmented Taylor rule considered in this analysis would perform better than the standard,
conventional Taylor rule, as indicated by the welfare gains ﬁgures. In fact, a standard Taylor
rule is more welfare costly than leaning against the wind policy mandates in a macroeconomic
framework in which ﬁnancial frictions are also modelled, implying a welfare loss of 0.06% in
ce1(%).
From the point of view of inﬂation stabilisation however, a rule responding to credit spreads
would have a worse performance than a standard one. In fact, rules reacting to credit spreads
and asset prices are related to higher inﬂation volatility, as claimed in the literature. Therefore,
our results suggest that the monetary policy rule that seems to make a compromise between
welfare maximization and inﬂation stability is one reacting to ﬂuctuations in credit around its
steady-state, since it delivers a smaller welfare loss than a standard Taylor rule, at the same
time it proportionates lower inﬂation, output and interest rate volatility.
3.2 Optimal Monetary and Macro-prudential Policies
In this section, we assess the eﬀectiveness of macro-prudential policy in terms of welfare max-
imization and macroeconomic stabilisation. We also determine the most eﬃcient institutional
arrangement of monetary and macro-prudential policies. The macro-prudential instrument
adopted in this exercise is a tax on bank loans, τt, although given the way the banking regu-
lation is modelled in this paper, it is feasible to apply the same type of welfare analysis using
a subsidy on net worth instead. This innovative feature of the model allows us to compare the
eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent kind of macro-prudential tools in terms of welfare impact. In the case
of choosing a subsidy on net worth, the welfare gains are not as large as in the situation a tax on
loans is selected. For this reason, we opt for showing in detail the optimal policy outcomes when
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a tax on loans is considered as a macro-prudential instrument, although we comment brieﬂy on
the results attained when the macro-prudential tool is a subsidy on net worth.
Our analysis is conducted based on two additional policy mandates. First, we consider a
policy mandate featuring macro-prudential policy rules alongside a standard monetary policy
stance. In other words, we assume that each policy maker, i.e. the monetary authority and the
macro-prudential regulator, focuses on their own policy objective, suggesting that the monetary
authority sets interest rates to respond to ﬂuctuations in inﬂation and output, whereas the
macro-prudential regulator sets taxes on loans to control for deviations of ﬁnancial variables from
their paths. Second, we propose a policy regime in which both monetary and macro-prudential
rules respond to ﬁnancial imbalances, to assess a partially uniﬁed institutional mandate. In
this case, we admit a monetary policy maker that not only pursues price stability, but it is
also concerned about the stability of the ﬁnancial system as a whole, as a mean to maximize
households' utility. Therefore, we suggest an augmented monetary policy rule, alongside a
macro-prudential policy rule.13
Then, we recover the welfare and macroeconomic stabilization outcomes from 2.6.1 for the
baseline case given by a standard Taylor rule, and we contrast them with the results obtained
for policy regimes comprising macro-prudential regulation.
As before, we assess the welfare losses / gains using consumption equivalence measures.
Furthermore, the stabilization eﬀects of adding macro-prudential policy on output, inﬂation
and interest rates are investigated as well, by computing the volatility for each of these three
variables. Since we are interested in assessing the impact of macro-prudential regulation in
normal times as well as abnormal times, a multi-shock environment is considered, including all
the shocks already described above: productivity, government spending, mark-up, monetary
policy, macro-prudential policy, capital quality and trend shocks. Then, we optimize macro-
prudential policies in this multi-shock scenario, considered more realistic since macro-prudential
regulation is expected to deal with diﬀerent sources of economic shocks simultaneously (Angelini
et al. 2011).
Results from computation of optimal simple rules are shown in the following sections for
each policy mandate: separate and partially uniﬁed.
13We could have suggested a totally uniﬁed policy mandate, by assuming that macro-prudential policy reacts
not only to ﬁnancial imbalances, but also to price stability (by considering it was also feeding back on inﬂation
ﬂuctuations around its steady-state). Nonetheless, we consider that a partially uniﬁed regime is a more realistic
scenario, since there is a consensual view among academics and policy makers that the macro-prudential policy
goals should focus exclusively on ﬁnancial system stability, leaving inﬂation volatility as a monetary policy
responsibility.
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3.2.1 Results for the Separate Policy Mandate
To simulate a separate mandate, we assume that each policymaker is solely concerned with
their own policy goal. The monetary policymaker is a conventional one in the sense it targets
price stability only, by following a standard Taylor rule. On the other hand, to investigate
the role of macro-prudential policy in stabilising the economy, we deﬁne alternative types of
macro-prudential policy rules, by considering distinct ﬁnancial stability targets. Against this
background, a macro-prudential rule is set that reacts exclusively to credit, credit spreads, loan-
to-GDP ratio or credit growth. Admitting the possibility of having a macro-prudential policy
rule feeding back on more than one ﬁnancial indicator, we also analyse a rule reacting to credit
and credit spreads, simultaneously.
The coeﬃcients are computed jointly for each type of rule, and their optimised values are
shown below, in Table 4:
Table 4: Separate Mandate - Optimised Coeﬃcients
# Policy Regimes
Monetary Policy Rules
ρr (1− ρr)θr,pi (1− ρr)θr,y
1 STR (Std Taylor Rule) 0.1697 4.4243 0.0711
5 STR + MR Credit 0.3770 3.5734 0.0473
6 STR + MR Cred. Spreads 0.9411 1.6036 1.0000
7 STR + MR Loan-to-Y Ratio 0.3285 3.3181 0.0744
8 STR + MR Credit Growth 0.3814 3.5988 0.0455
9 STR + MR Credit & Spreads 0.6128 1.6821 1.0000
# Policy Regimes
Macro-prudential Policy Rules
ρτ (1− ρτ )ατ,QS (1− ρτ )ατ,s (1− ρτ )ατ,QS/Y (1− ρτ )ατ,cgt/cgss
1 STR (Std Taylor Rule) - - - - -
5 STR + MR Credit 0.0000 0.0145 - - -
6 STR + MR Cred. Spreads 0.1195 - -1.5600 - -
7 STR + MR Loan-to-Y Ratio 0.0000 - - 0.0167 -
8 STR + MR Credit Growth 0.0000 - - - 0.0146
9 STR + MR Credit & Spreads 0.0000 0.0079 -1.7147 - -
There are two main ﬁndings from this exercise. First, introducing an additional policy
instrument (i.e. a tax on bank loans) leads to a decrease on the aggressiveness of the response
of a standard Taylor rule to deviations of inﬂation from its steady state. Under a standard
Taylor rule, the degree of aggressiveness is (1−ρt)θr,pi = 4.4, whereas under a policy regime that
combines both a standard Taylor rule and a macro-prudential rule, it ranges from a minimum of
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(1−ρt)θr,pi = 1.6 when reacting to ﬂuctuations credit spreads, to a maximum of θr,pi = 3.6, when
responding to ﬂuctuations in credit or credit growth around their steady-state. Therefore, the
need for the monetary policy maker to react strongly to ﬂuctuations of inﬂation rates around its
steady-state is attenuated when macro-prudential policy is in place. This result may suggest that
macro-prudential authority can give a hand to the monetary policy maker in certain economic
circumstances. Regarding its eﬀects on the magnitude of monetary policy reaction to the output
gap, results are mixed, since although some policy regimes, such as 5 and 8, register output gap
optmised coeﬃcients below the baseline rule, there are other policy regimes in which this does
not verify (policy regimes 6, 7 and 9).
Second, the optimal reaction of macro-prudential policy is a rise in the tax on loans to
increases in credit and loan-to-GDP ratio and a cut on taxes following a rise in credit spreads.
Hence, results conﬁrm the countercyclical nature of macro-prudential regulation. Moreover, it
is worth noting that the degree of persistence of the macro-prudential instrument is non-existent
for almost all the policy rules considered in this analysis, except when a policy regime comprising
a standard Taylor rule and a macro-prudential rule feeding back on credit spreads is in place.
In this policy regime, the optimal response for the macro-prudential policy tool is 0.1195.
Table 5 shows the computed welfare losses and standard deviations for interest rates, inﬂation
and output for each macro-prudential rule. An important result of this analysis is that macro-
prudential regulation improves welfare. This is observed based on the consumption equivalence
outcomes, since the largest loss in consumption is achieved when monetary policy alone reacts to
the shocks aﬀecting this economy (0.06% of consumption loss, when comparing with the welfare
maximizing policy regime featuring a standard Taylor rule and a macro-prudential policy rule
feeding back on spreads and credit). In the case macro-prudential regulation is deployed, the
welfare loss decreases, achieving its minimum in a mandate in which a standard Taylor rule is
coupled with a macro-prudential rule reacting to both credit and credit spreads. Nonetheless,
the gains of having macro-prudential policy are small in this economy, varying from a minimum
of 0.04% (policy regime 6) to a maximum of 0.06% (policy regime 9). This ﬁnding is in line
with the conclusions of Angelini et al. [2011] and De Paoli and Paustian [2012], whom also
found modest gains of introducing macro-prudential regulation based on alternative economic
frameworks.
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Table 5: Separate Mandate - Welfare Losses / Gains and Std Deviations
# Policy Regimes Λ
Welfare Loss Welfare Gain
σr σpi σy
ce1 (%) ce2 (%)
1 STR only -1.88653 0.0638 Baseline 0.0119 0.0020 0.0230
5 STR + MR Credit -1.88644 0.0228 0.0415 0.0114 0.0021 0.0157
6 STR + MR Credit Spreads -1.88645 0.0263 0.0375 0.0094 0.0023 0.0155
7 STR + MR Loan-to-GDP Ratio -1.88645 0.0245 0.0392 0.0116 0.0022 0.0159
8 STR + MR Credit Growth -1.88644 0.0223 0.0415 0.0113 0.0021 0.0157
9 STR + MR Credit & Spreads -1.88639 0.0000 0.0638 0.0102 0.0017 0.0143
The ﬁndings suggest that the policy regime that minimizes welfare losses also attains a lower
volatility of inﬂation and output, thus being more eﬃcient in stabilising the economy. In what
concerns the measure of inﬂation stability, a Std TR only is preferable to a policy regime
comprising macro-prudential policy, since the inﬂation volatility is lower under this regime
(σpi = 0.0020). Regarding output stabilization, this is better achieved under policy regimes that
couples a standard Taylor rule with a macro-prudential rule, reaching its minimum under a Std
TR + MR reacting to Credit Spreads mandate.
Rules that target diﬀerent proxies for credit imbalances, such as credit deviations from
steady state values, loan-to-GDP ratio and credit growth, provide very similar results in terms
of welfare. However, the rule that seems to work best is the one reacting to credit growth,
since it delivers the lowest welfare loss (0.0223%, in consumption equivalence terms). This rule
also minimizes inﬂation and output volatility, as well as a rule reacting to credit deviations
from its steady-state values. Among these three rules, the macro-prudential policy rule that
performs worst is the one reacting to loan-to-GDP ratio, since it does not improve the outcomes
produced by the other two alternative rules: inﬂation and output are more volatile and welfare
loss is larger under this policy arrangement. In addition, a macro-prudential policy rule feeding
back exclusively on credit spreads does not provide better outcomes than the one responding
to loan-to-GDP ratio, both in terms of welfare and inﬂation stabilization.
Furthermore, from the analysis of the standard deviations obtained for interest rates, the
conclusion is that including macro-prudential policy in this set up decreases the probability
of hitting the zero lower bound, since the volatility of interest rates declines when a macro-
prudential policy arrangement is introduced.
3.2.2 Results for the Partially Uniﬁed Policy Mandate
In this section, the welfare and stabilization outcomes from the joint optimization of mandates
composed by monetary policy rules reacting to ﬁnancial variables and macro-prudential regu-
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lation are explored. This exercise aims at mimicking a partially uniﬁed institutional regime, in
which both monetary and macro-prudential policies feed back on ﬁnancial stability variables.
This regime is diﬀerent from a complete uniﬁed regime, which would be characterized by each
policy targeting both price and ﬁnancial stability. However, it seems unrealistic to assume that
macro-prudential regulation would be also concerned about inﬂation stabilization, being more
likely to consider a wider scope of intervention for monetary policy.
It should be noted though that, unlike for example De Paoli and Paustian [2012] and Gelain
et al. [2013], we are not comparing coordination in the form of joint maximization with a
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium for non-coordination. For both regimes the same welfare
criteria is used, so with given forms of simple rules a Nash equilibrium would be a `team-
optimal solution' and give an identical outcome as with coordination (see Basar and Olsder
[1982], chapter 6). Rather the uniﬁed and separate mandates both jointly (though it could be
in a Nash equilibrium) maximize the welfare, but under diﬀerent constraints on the rules that
reﬂect the diﬀerent targets for the nominal and regulatory instruments in the two cases.
In order to simulate a partially uniﬁed regime, we consider alternative combinations of
augmented Taylor rules and macro-prudential regulation rules. First, we assume that both
monetary and macro-prudential rules feed back on deviations of credit from its steady state. The
second and third policy regime alternatives combine a monetary policy and macro-prudential
rule reacting both to credit spreads and loan-to-value ratio, respectively. As a last combination,
we broaden the range of ﬁnancial targets that policies feed back on, assuming that they react
jointly to credit and credit spreads.
Tables 6 and 7 show the optimised coeﬃcients under these alternative policy combinations.
Results are in line with the ones obtained for a separate regime. First, the optimal magnitude of
monetary policy reaction to inﬂation decreases whenever macro-prudential regulation is deployed
suggesting that monetary policy does not need to be that aggressive whenever macro-prudential
tools are in place. Second, the optimal macro-prudential policy is of a countercyclical nature,
since it responds positively to deviations of credit and loan-to-GDP ratio from their respective
steady-state values and negatively to deviations of credit spreads from their steady-state values.
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Table 6: Partially Uniﬁed Mandate - Monetary Policy Optimised Coeﬃcients
#
Policy Regimes Monetary Policy Rules
Aug TR + MR ρr θr,pi θr,y θr,QS θr,s θr,QS/Y θr,cgt/cgss
10 Reacting to Credit 0.396 3.782 0.010 0.014 - - -
11 React. to Spreads 0.231 3.212 1.058 - -0.415 - -
12 React. to Loan-to-GDP Ratio 0.366 3.566 0.042 - - 0.022 -
13 React. Credit Growth 0.387 3.715 0.036 - - - 0.015
14 React. to Cred. & Spreads 0.331 2.808 0.945 0.027 -0.518 - -
Table 7: Partially Uniﬁed Mandate - Macro-prudential Policy Optimised Coeﬃcients
#
Policy Regimes Macro-prudential Policy Rules
Aug TR + MR ρτ ατ,QS ατ,s ατ,QS/Y ατ,cgt/cgss
10 React. to Credit 0.00 0.014 - - -
11 React. to Spreads 0.00 - -2.369 - -
12 React. to Loan-to-Y Ratio 0.00 - - 0.016 -
13 React. Credit Growth 0.00 - - - 0.014
14 React. to Cred. & Spreads 0.00 0.016 -1.817 - -
Table 8 shows computation outputs for welfare losses and standard deviations for the par-
tially uniﬁed alternative policy regimes. To facilitate comparison across the alternative policy
regimes, this table also displays the baseline policy regime, given by a standard Taylor rule only,
and the policy regime with better performance so far in what concerns welfare maximization,
given by a separate regime featuring a standard Taylor rule and a macro-prudential policy rule
responding to credit and spreads.
In what regards the impact of diﬀerent policy mandates on welfare losses, we conclude that
the partially uniﬁed regime promotes an increase in welfare compared to a separate mandate,
but only when macro-prudential regulation reacts simultaneously to credit and credit spreads
(the welfare gain is 0.07%, greater than the attained by policy regime 9, 0.06%). Otherwise,
a separate regime is preferable to a partially uniﬁed one, according to these outcomes. Nev-
ertheless, the gains from coordination are still modest: in consumption equivalence terms, a
separate regime implies a 0.01% welfare loss and a standard Taylor rule implies a 0.07% loss,
when compared to a partially uniﬁed regime that reacts to credit and credit spreads.
Inﬂation stabilization, on the other hand, is better achieved in a separate mandate, com-
posed by a standard Taylor rule and macro-prudential regulation responding jointly to credit
and spreads. Another result worth highlighting is that, as before, a macro-prudential policy
reacting to the loan-to-GDP ratio does not provide an improvement over a rule responding to
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credit deviations only. This indicator also performs poorly not only in terms of welfare losses
minimization, but also regarding inﬂation, output and interest rate stabilization.
Table 8: Partially Uniﬁed Mandate - Welfare Losses and Std Deviations
# Policy Regimes Λ
Welfare Loss Welfare Gain
σr σpi σy
ce1 (%) ce2 (%)
1 Std TR only -1.886534 0.0740 Baseline 0.0119 0.0020 0.0230
9 Std TR + MR Credit & Spreads -1.886391 0.0103 0.0638 0.0102 0.0017 0.0143
Aug TR + MR
10 React. to Credit -1.886437 0.0308 0.0433 0.0112 0.0021 0.0156
11 React. to Spreads -1.886403 0.0156 0.0584 0.0112 0.0019 0.0151
12 React. to Loan-to-Y Ratio -1.886440 0.0321 0.0419 0.0113 0.0022 0.0157
13 React. to Credit Growth -1.886437 0.0308 0.0433 0.0112 0.0021 0.0155
14 React. to Credit & Spreads -1.886368 0.0000 0.0740 0.0108 0.0018 0.0127
3.3 Subsidy on Net Worth as a Macro-prudential Tool
Since we conceived a model in which is possible to assess the degree of eﬀectiveness of alternative
macro-prudential tools, such as a tax on loans or a subsidy on net worth, we performed the same
optimal policy approach, but now using a subsidy on net worth as the macro-prudential tool. It
should be expected that, when credit surpasses its steady-state path, subsidies on net worth are
decreased, thereby contracting loans and dampening the business cycle. In turn, when credit
spreads exceed their steady-state values, subsidies on net worth are raised, thereby decreasing
loans and dampening the business cycle.
As already mentioned, although the use of a subsidy on net worth is also welfare improving,
conﬁrming the importance of adopting macro-prudential tools in counterveiling ﬁnancial imbal-
ances, it underperforms the tax on loans welfare beneﬁts. Table 9summarises these outcomes.
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Table 9: Comparison of Macro-prudential Tools
Subsidy on Net Worth Tax on Loans
# Policy Regimes Λ
Welfare Loss Welfare Gain Welfare Loss Welfare Gain
ce1 (%) ce2 (%) ce1 (%) ce2 (%)
1 Std TR only -1.88653 0.0384 Baseline 0.0638 Baseline
5 Std TR + MR Credit -1.88647 0.0080 0.0303 0.0228 0.0415
6 Std TR + MR Spreads -1.88652 0.0326 0.0058 0.0263 0.0638
9 Std TR + MR Credit & Spreads -1.88645 0.0000 0.0384 0.0000 0.0392
Augmented TR + MR
10 React. to Credit -1.886468 0.0232 0.0294 0.0308 0.0433
11 React. to Spreads -1.886472 0.0250 0.0277 0.0156 0.0584
14 React. to Credit & Spreads -1.886416 0.0000 0.0526 0.0000 0.0740
4 Conclusions
This paper aims at contributing to the debate regarding the role of monetary policy and tradi-
tional regulatory and prudential frameworks on promoting macroeconomic stability. We built a
DSGE model with price rigidities and ﬁnancial frictions a la Gertler and Karadi [2011] in order
to assess the importance of macro-prudential and monetary policies in improving welfare and
stabilising the economy. In particular, we investigate whether it is welfare beneﬁcial to have a
monetary policy strategy that also leans against the build up of ﬁnancial imbalances and we
compare it with a policy mandate in which macro-prudential regulation is also considered.
Our optimal policy exercises, obtained in the context of a linearized model that excludes
ﬁnancial (in)stability and default, provide three main ﬁndings. First, it is welfare improving
to have a monetary policy stance that reacts countercyclically to asset prices. Nonetheless,
there is a trade-oﬀ in terms of inﬂation stabilization, since an augmented Taylor rule of this
type would involve more prices volatility than a standard one. A compromise between welfare
maximization and inﬂation stability seems to be achieved under a policy regime characterised
by an augmented Taylor rule that feeds back on deviations of credit from its steady-state path.
Second, the consideration of a policy mandate in which monetary policy is complemented
by macro-prudential regulation is welfare improving, regardless of the type of policy mandate
adopted. The welfare maximizing mandate is one in which an augmented Taylor rule reacting
to credit and credit spreads is combined with a macro-prudential rule that responds to credit
and credit spreads as well. The welfare gains from a partially uniﬁed mandate are of the order
of a consumption equivalent improvement of 0.07% when compared with the baseline case,
given by a standard Taylor rule only. This improvement is, in fact, small, but aligned with
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previous ﬁndings in the literature (see, for instance, De Paoli and Paustian [2012], Angelini
et al. [2011]). Inﬂation stabilization, on the other hand, is better accomplished in a separate
mandate, in which we have a standard Taylor rule feeding back on inﬂation and output gaps,
and a macro-prudential rule responding to credit and spreads.
Lastly, the countercyclical nature of macro-prudential instruments is backed by our optimal
policy simulations.
The ﬁndings of this paper must be interpreted carefully, since they result from DSGE models
with typical solution techniques based on log-linearization, which do not allow for the non-
linear dynamics that usually characterize boom-bust episodes. Despite the absence of non-
linearities in these models, the importance for monetary policy to lean against the wind and
for considering macro-prudential policy as an ancillary tool to deal with ﬁnancial imbalances is
entirely conﬁrmed by simply granting a non-negligible role to ﬁnancial intermediation provided
by the banking system.
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Appendix 1
The regulated banking sector
Assuming a tax / subsidy scheme, in the lines of Gertler et al. [2012] and De Paoli and Paustian
[2012], total taxes from the macro-prudential regulation scheme are given by
TMRt = τtQtSt − τ stNt (52)
The timing of the tax regime is as follows. In period t− 1, tax and subsidy rates τt−1, τ st−1
are set to be paid or received on the value of end-of-period t − 1 (or beginning of period t)
loans Qt−1st−1 and end-of-period net worth nt−1 respectively. The net worth of the bank then
accumulates in period t according to:
nt = Rk,tQt−1st−1 −Rext dt−1 + τ st−1nt−1 − τt−1Qt−1st−1 (53)
That is, net worth equals gross returns minus gross costs of borrowing, plus subsidies minus
taxes carried over over from the previous period. Banks are atomistic and take the tax rate and
subsidy as exogenous.
With this timing for taxes or subsidies, the balance sheet of the bank in period t remains as
before:
Qtst = nt + dt (54)
which says that net worth plus subsidies plus deposits can be used to ﬁnance loans net of tax.
As before we can substitute for dt from (54) and rewrite (53) to give
nt = R
ex
t nt−1 + (Rk,t −Rext )Qt−1st−1 − TMRt−1
= (Rext + τ
s
t−1)nt−1 + (Rk,t −Rext − τt−1)Qt−1st−1 (55)
which says that net worth at the end of period t equals the gross return at a real riskless rate
plus the excess return over the latter on the assets plus subsidies minus taxes carried over from
the previous period.
As for the laissez faire banking sector model, the optmisation problem for the banks to chose
a path for borrowing to maximize Vt subject to the incentive constraint 57:
Vt(st, nt, ) = µs,tQtst + µn,tnt (56)
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s. t.
Vt ≥ ΘtQtst (57)
and write the Bellman equation for a given path for nt in the form
Vt−1(st−1, nt−1) = EtΛt,t+1[(1− σB)nt + σB max
st
Vt(st, nt)] (58)
Again we perform the optimization maxst Vt(st, nt) subject to the incentive constraint. The ﬁrst
order conditions for this optimization problem are as before with a slight notational diﬀerence
that νd,t is replaced with µn,t:
st : (1 + λt)µs,t = λtΘ
λt : µs,tQtst + µn,tnt ≥ ΘQtst
Again deﬁne φt to be the leverage ratio:
Qtst = φtnt (59)
Assuming the incentive constraint always binds, φt is given by
φt =
µn,t
Θ− µs,t (60)
Using (60) we can write (56) as
Vt = [µs,tφt + µn,t]nt (61)
and hence (58) becomes
Vt(st, nt) = EtΛt,t+1[1− σB + σB(µs,t+1φt+1 + µn,t+1)]nt+1
= EtΛt,t+1Ωt+1[(Rk,t+1 −Rext+1 − τt)Qtst + (Rext+1 + τ st )nt] (62)
deﬁning Ωt = 1−σB +σB(µn,t+φtµs,t), the shadow value of a unit of net worth, and using (38).
The equilibrium of the banking model is given by
St = Kt
(1 + λt)µs,t = λtΘ
QtSt = φtNt
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φt =
µn,t
Θ− µs,t
Nt = Rk,t(σB + ξB)Qt−1St−1 − σBRext Dt−1 − σBTMRt−1
Dt = QtSt −Nt
TMRt = τtQtSt − τ stNt
µn,t = Et
[
Λt,t+1Ωt+1(R
ex
t+1 + τ
s
t )
]
µs,t = Et
[
Λt,t+1Ωt+1(Rk,t+1 −Rext+1 − τt))
]
Ωt = 1− σB + σB(µd,t + φtµs,t)
Rk,t =
Zt + (1− δ)Qt
Qt−1
Zt =
(1− α)PWt Y Wt
Kt−1
with τ st or τt exogenous. Clearly in the absence of taxes or subsidies, i.e. τt = τ
s
t = 0, we get
back to the previous set-up.
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